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ance hv Colorado should rely on
data developed by the Colorado
Water Courts?

Robert "Bo" Abrams is a profess
or of law at Florida A & M
University, College of Law in
Orlando, Florida. He is an elected
member of the American Law
Institute, co-author of one of the
leading water law casebooks, and a
past chair of the ABA Water
Resources Committee. He can be
reached at (407) 254-4001 or
rha@aa-design.com

Did the special master correctly find
that Colorado was in compliance
with its ARC obligations for the
years 1997-1999?
Should the special master be
required to make recommendations
on all issues pending before him?
FACTS
Kansas and Colorado have been
wrangling over the use of Arkansas
River water since the end of the
century-the nineteenth century
that is. The crux of the dispute i;,
and always has been, that Kansas
believes Colorado is taking more
Arkansas River water than is consistent with the rights of Kansas. As
touched on more fully in the Case
.Analysis section, the theories and
legal backdrops have evolved over
time. 1\vice before in decisions

ISSUES
Should the Supreme Court appoint
a river master to administer its
decree in this case?
Should the special master calculate
prejudgment interest from 1985 to
present on all amounts owed to
Kansas for water shortages suffered
in and before 1985, the year in
which Kansas filed this lawsuit, or is
prejudgment interest only owed on
amounts for which Color~do is
liable that were incurred after filing
of the current lawsuit in 1985?

(Continued on Page JO)

Did the special master err in fixing a
10-year period, rather than annual
measurements, as the basis for
determining Arkansas River
Compact (ARC) compliance by
Colorado?

serves many water users
in the states of Colorado
and Kansas. The current
litigation is at least the
fourth major effort in the
last 100 years by these
neighboring states to
settle issues of Arkansas
River water allocation
between them. The nub
of the current dispute is
the proper administration
and enforcement of a
plan that has been
devised to take account
of the substantial amount
of groundwater pumping
in Colorado that affects
the river's now in Kansas.

KANSA.S I: COLORIDO

DOCI\ET No. 105, ORIGINAL
ARGl'-,IEI\T DATE:
OCTOBER -1,2004
FROM: EXCEPTIO)iS TO THE
FOURTH REpORT OF THE
SPECIAL MASTER

Did the special master correctly
decide that calculations that are
critical to assessing ARC compli-
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announced in 1906 and 1943,
Kansas sought relief in the United
States Supreme Court and was
rebuffed. The second time, the
Court urged the states to negotiate
an interstate compact to govern
their water relations on the
Arkansas River. They did and in
1948 entered into the ARC.
The ARC sought to "[e]quitably
divide and apportion" the river's
water and the benefits of the John
Martin reservoir, which is built on
the river's mainstem. ARC, Art. I. A
point of importance was to allow
continued development in the
region using the river's waters, but
the waters, "shall not be materially
depleted in usable quantities or
availability" by post-ARC activities.
ARC Art. IV-D. The ARC created an
implementing agency, the Arkansas
River Compact Authority (ARCA).
The states are equally represented,
each has one vote on ARCA, there
is a non-voting federal chairman,
and "every decision, authorization
or other action shall require unanimous vote." ARC Art. VIII.
The current proceedings have
endured for a score of years, having
been commenced by Kansas in
1985, alleging violations of Article
IV-D. In 1990, the special master
filed his First Report. Both states
objected, and in 1995, the Supreme
Court overruled all objections (i.e.,
upheld the special master's decision) and ruled that increased postARC groundwater pumping in
Colorado had violated the ARC and
remanded the case to the special
master. 514 U.S. 673 (1995). In the
next decade, the special master,
Arthur Littleworth, took on the task
of assessing the amount of the violations from 1950-1994, and later for
1995 and 1996, and also addressed
the issue of remedy for the violations. He filed his Second, Third,
and Fourth Reports in 1997, 2000,
and 2003, respectively.

During that period, the Supreme
Court issued another opinion resolving several remedial issues, deciding
that the Eleventh Amendment does
not prevent Kansas from recovering
losses that are attributable to losses
of its individual citizens, permitting
an award of prejudgment interest to
Kansas despite the unliquidated (no
pun intended) nature of Kansas's
damage claims, upholding the interest rate adopted by the special master, but sustaining Colorado's objection to the award of prejudgment
interest for prefiling years (i.e.
1950-1985). The Court also upheld
the method used by the special
master to value the crop losses of
Kansas water users. 533 U.S. 1
(2001).
In the wake of the 2001 Supreme
Court opinion, the legal issues largely were decided, leaving only moreor-less technical problems such as
the need to measure the effect that
groundwater pumping in Colorado
has on the flow of the Arkansas in
Kansas. Computer modeling drives
the subsequent calculation of
whether there has been any shortfall by Colorado under the ARC and,
thereafter, the imputed crop losses
and monetary damage amounts. The
parties tried unsuccessfully to settle
and thereafter proceeded to trial
before the special master. A major
issue at trial was how to model the
system to calculate compliance or
the extent of the violation. The parties had already agreed to use a
computer model referred to as the
Hydrologic-Institutional Model (H-I
Model), but its use is not totally
mechanical, raising issues about
what data should be used and how
to interpret that data. As might be
suspected at this point, the parties
disagreed on those issues and several others, such as the meaning of
the Supreme Court's 2001 ruling on
prejudgment interest and whether
Colorado had violated the ARC in
1997-1999. Importantly, Kansas,
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anticipating that violations might
continue into the future, wanted a
"river master" appointed and to
have violations calculated every
year. The special master recommended otherwise and also left
unresolved several issues that
Kansas had raised and wanted
addressed.

CASE ANALYSIS
The Arkansas River, which rises
near Aspen and flows south and
east, is itself an important source of
water for Colorado's East Slope residents. The critical dispute in more
recent years relates to groundwater
pumping in Colorado that affects
the river, rather than withdrawals
from the river and reservoir operations. As a hydrogeological matter,
groundwater pumping in Colorado
affects the flow of the Arkansas
River as it flows through Kansas.
Stated somewhat differently,
groundwater that is withdrawn upgradient in Colorado reduces the
base flow of the Arkansas in the
state of Kansas. At this stage in
time, that much is not in dispute.
Moreover, in this round of litigation,
Kansas and Colorado have agreed
on a model to use for calculating
and quantifying those effects. Along
with a number of ancillary questions regarding administration of
the Arkansas River in the future and
the dollar amount to be paid for
past ARC violations, the most vital
questions in this case revolve
around what data and judgments
are to be employed in the H-I operating river model.
This particular case marks the third
time that Kansas has invoked the
original jurisdiction of the United
States Supreme Court to adjudicate
its grievances with Colorado in
regard to the Arkansas River. In the
first litigation, matters of great legal
import were decided by the Supreme
Court regarding the relative rights
among states that are alongside

Issue No.1
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(riparian to) the same watercourse.
In the second litigation, the Supreme
Court summarized its first decision,
rendered in two stages in 1902 and
1906 as follows:
The court [in 1902] denied
Kansas' contention that she was
entitled to have the stream flow
as it flowed in a state of nature. It
denied Colorado's claim that she
could dispose of all the waters
within her borders, and owed no
obligation to pass any of them on
to Kansas. It declared [in 1906]
that as each state had an equality
of right each stood before the
court on the same level as the
other; that inquiry was not confined to the question whether any
portion of the river waters were
withheld by Colorado but must
include the effect of what had
been done upon the conditions in
the respective states; and that the
court must adjust the dispute on
the basis of equality of rights to
secure, so far as possible, to
Colorado, the benefits of irrigation, without depriving Kansas of
the benefits of a flowing stream.
The measure of the reciprocal
rights and obligations of the
states was declared to be an equitable apportionment of the benefits of the river. The court added
that, before the developments in
Colorado consequent upon irrigation were to be destroyed or
materially affected, Kansas must
show not merely some technical
right but one which carried corresponding benefits. Kansas 'V.
Colorado, 320 U.S. 383, 385-386
(1943)
The second litigation again resulted
in no relief for Kansas, but the
Supreme Court advised the two
states that they would best be
served by negotiating an interstate
compact to govern their respective
uses of the Arkansas River.
Following the Court's decision, the

ARC was relatively quickly negotiated and ratified, and it went into
effect in 1948. Almost immediately,
Kansas began to claim that groundwater pumping in Colorado was violating the ARC. The matter was of
grave concern to Colorado, for the
groundwater pumping on its Front
Range/Easy Slope was vital to continued development and growth-all
surface streams there were already
fully appropriated. The dispute simmered for 35 years, at which point
Kansas, for the third time, was
granted leave to invoke the original
jurisdiction of the United States
Supreme Court. This time, rather
than seeking relief as an equitable
apportionment case, Kansas claimed
that Colorado was violating the
ARC. Similar compact enforcement
litigation had achieved prominence
in relation to the Pecos River
Compact. In 1983, the state of
Texas won the right to have its
claims of underdelivery by the
upstream state adjudicated. See
Texas 'V. New Mexico I, 462 U.S.
554 (1983). Shortly after this case
was filed, Texas won an impressive
victory that called upon New Mexico
to remedy its underdeliveries. See
Texas 'V. New Mexico II, -182 U.S.
12-1 (1987).
As this case plodded along, it generated little fanfare but bred much
frustration. Were it not for claiming
to protect state sovereignty, it might
be fair to characterize this case as
one in which the process of disputing has come to overshadow the dispute. As an annual average, the
amounts of water "won" by Kansas
total approximately 10,000 acre-feet
per year. (An acre foot of water is a
typical agricultural measure of
quantity: it is roughly 325,000 gallons, or the amount of water that
covers one acre of land to a depth of
one foot. In this portion of the
Arkansas River Valley, a typical
farmer might apply between two
and four acre-feet per acre, per year,

depending on the crop and the timing of rainfall in relation to the
maturity of the plants under cultivation.) The value of that water in
agricultural use is rather modest,
certainly less than $100 per acre
foot, so that the 10,000 acre feet
involved as an annual average translates to less than .81 million per
year. That is a very small amount in
relation to the size of the regional
agricultural economy. To sound a
sardonic note, it is probable that the
states' annual litigation costs have
greatly exceeded that amount.

SIGNIFICANCE
Like many interstate water disputes,
this case does not seem destined to
have much influence and application
beyond its factual setting. In this
case, it is unlikely that what is being
decided will even have a profound
impact on residents of the region,
even though the Arkansas River is a
key source of supply. That is because
the larger questions of water use and
water for future economic development were settled by the ARC, or in
the earlier phases of this litigation,
and all that remains are questions at
the margin. The matters still at issue
in this case involve very small
amounts of water and, when the
nature of the debtor and the debt are
considered, rather small amounts of
money. More specifically, what are at
stake are small variations in model
operations and the administrative
process and a S2..J: million ambiguity
in the 2001 Supreme Court opinion
regarding the calculation of prejudgment interest. Even that number is
not large when one considers it
involves a state's liability for obligations that were imposed for actions
taken during the period 1950 to
1985, and that it is that large only as
a result of 20 years of compounding
interest on 30 previous years of
indebtedness.

(Continued on Page 32)
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There are two possible exceptions
to the generalization that this case
has little significance, but both are
rather subtle and grow out of the
presence of an interstate compact.
The first possible area of larger significance in this case relates to the
ongoing administration of the ARC.
At least a few other interstate water
compacts have a voting mechanism,
similar to that of the ARC, which
create the possibility of impasse
when a significant dispute arises.
Kansas contends that the likelihood
of the need for ongoing administration and judgment in the application of the H-I Model augers in favor
of the appointment of a "river master" who would have continuing
authority to resolve computermodeling issues. This approach,
Kansas argues, would avoid the
need for a periodic renewal of
litigation under the auspices of a
special master.
At bottom, this request poses a
somewhat larger issue of institutional arrangements and of the role of
the Supreme Court in the exercise
of its jurisdiction to adjudicate suits
among the states when there also is
an interstate compact in place. In
the main, the Court itself, citing
strong separation of powers arguments, is quite hesitant to become
involved in compact administration,
due to the special status of compacts as instruments entered into
by states and requiring the express
consent of Congress under Article I,
section 10 of the United States
Constitution. Nevertheless, Kansas
points to the efficiency and lowprofile success that has been had in
another high-profile case in which
the Court appointed a river master,
That case involved the Pecos River
dispute between Texas and New
Mexico, a case with a similar provision for unanimous decision making
that, like this one, resulted in protracted and extremely expensive
Supreme Court litigation. The after-

math on the Pecos, however, has
been relative calm and has been
facilitated by the ongoing work of a
river master.
The second area of potential broader interest in this case concerns the
special master's decision to calculate compliance using a 10-year
period, rather than making an annual calculation. A decision to uphold
the 10-year calculation tends to
favor the upstream state by allowing
de facto averaging of water deliveries. Thus, for example, the upstream
state in a dry year could underdeliver and make up for it in a wet
year. In that scenario, the downstream state is put at risk in a dry
year. Conversely, an every-year
measure of compliance, as advocated by Kansas (the downstream
state) puts the risk of dry years
entirely on the upstream state.
Neither approach is entirely equitable, but the difficulty of measuring
and adapting to in-year dry conditions to share the available water
fairly eliminates what might otherwise be the most equitable option
for dealing with the problem.
Almost certainly, the Court will seek
to adhere strictly to the language of
the ARC itself on this point, which
will make this case turn on the
interpretation of the ARC. Even so,
much like the Kremlinologists who
used to follow the machinations of
the USSR's politburo, the water law
community will find hints in the
Court's opinion regarding the
Court's broader disposition toward
how such dilemmas are to be
solved.
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ArrORNEYS FOR THE
PARTIES
For the State of Kansas (John B.
Draper (505) 982-3873)
For the State of Colorado (David
W. Robbins (303) 296-8100)
For United States, DefendantIntervenor (in opposition to the
exceptions of Kansas) (Theodore B.
Olson, Solicitor General (202) 5142217)

Issue No.1
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